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ABSTRACT
The four largest firms in the Nevada slot route industry 
control over 70 percent of the industry. It's structure was 
shown to be highly concentrated using the Herfindahl-Herschman 
index.
The individual slot route operators appear to conduct 
themselves in a non-competitive manner by differentiating 
their respective products. Each firm in the industry 
established their own niche either through product or service 
differentiation.
Firms in concentrated industries tend to earn monopoly 
profits. Yet, using Tobin's q and Jensen's coefficient, we 
show that Nevada's slot route firms did not earn excess 
profits, despite the high degree of industrial concentration.
The presence of a high level of industrial concentration, 
non-competitive product differentiation, and the lack of 
economic profits may be explained in large measure by 
competition from casinos. The inclusion of slot route firms 
within a more broadly defined Nevada gaming industry would 
decrease concentration measures consistent with competitive 
market performance conditions found in this study.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Nevada slot route industry is composed of those 
establishments that offer non-traditional gaming in non-casino 
locations such as bars and supermarkets. During the past five 
years the industry has grown along with the population of the 
state of Nevada. Because of licensing, economies of scale, 
and other factors, the slot route industry's four largest 
firms control over 75' percent of the slot route market as of 
1991. This economic concentration will be analyzed and 
discussed to determine whether or not the large firms in this 
market have significant monopoly power.
As the industry has grown, so has its importance to the 
state of Nevada. Yet, an industrial organizational study of 
the Nevada slot route industry has never been done before. 
Furthermore, the degree of concentration in the industry 
increased. As a result, a need exists to describe the 
industry's structure, evaluate its conduct, and measure its 
performance.
This study will examine the four publicly held 
corporations in the industry. Data about the other firms were 
not available. However, these firms are very small. Also, 
revenue figures for the industry were not available, but proxy 
variables were developed. Thus, these data limitations did
not prove an insurmountable problem.
This paper will first examine the market for the services 
provided by the slot route operators. This will lead to a 
discussion of product differentiation and possible substitute 
services. The focus will then shift to the licensing 
qualifications necessary for entry into this industry. Next, 
the economic concentration of the industry will be measured 
and analyzed. The conduct and strategies of the individual 
firms will then be examined. The focus then will change to a 
financial analysis of the returns on assets and equity for 
firms in the industry. Finally, possible reasons for the 
oligopoly structure of the market and the estimated value of 
a restricted gaming license will be discussed.
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II. THE LITERATURE REVIEW
Joe S. Bain's Industrial Organization: A Treatise states 
that the "performance of the economy or individual parts of 
the economy are what is primary in analyzing an industry."1 
Bain asserts that it is necessary to not only see how firms 
perform, but to also explain how and why they perform in a 
particular manner. This type of analysis can be done by first 
observing how a market is structured, and then seeing how this 
structure leads to the conduct of firms in the market. This 
method will be used to analyze a key segment of Nevada's 
gaming industry, the slot route industry. First the supply 
and derived demand sides of the slot route industry will be 
examined, followed by an evaluation of the worth of a 
restricted gaming license.
The slot route industry has grown 50 percent since 1986.2 
In 1986 the industry had about 10,000 slot machines. The 
growth over the past five years has expanded the industry to 
over 15,000 machines in 1991. Most of the market share in 
this industry is in the top four firms. As a result, one 
would expect that this oligopolistic structure should lead to
1Joe S. Bain, and P. David Qualls, Industrial Organiza­
tion; A Treatise (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1989), p. 3.
2Nevada, Gaming Commission, "Quarterly Reports," 1986 to
1991.
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monopoly profits. Bain in his work showed that "either higher 
or lower seller concentration, or more difficult or easier 
entry, would have a significant impact on the incidence of 
scale inefficiencies.1,3 The higher the concentration level 
in an industry, generally the less competition exists and the 
greater the chance of collusion and economic profits. 
Furthermore, the slot route industry has a high degree of 
seller concentration. The four largest firms have over 70 
percent of the outstanding number of restricted slots 
statewide. This high degree of seller concentration should 
also "lead towards cooperative action to establish a joint 
profit maximizing industry price and output."4 Yet, this 
spirit of cooperation does not seem to have evolved in the 
slot route industry. Thus, despite the fact that the slot 
route industry has only four main suppliers, the currently 
regulated environment seems to have fostered competition.
In examining the demand side of this industry, the main 
users of these slots are bars, restaurants, and convenience 
stores. These establishments must obtain what is called a 
restricted gaming license in order to participate in this 
industry.5 The bargaining power of these locations is 
generally small, but certain businesses do have more
3Bain and Qualls, Industrial Organization, p. 7.
4Ibid., p. 83.
According to Nevada Revised Statute 463.018, the 
restricted gaming license is for establishments that have 15 
or fewer slot machines.
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bargaining power if they are part of a chain of stores.6
If a slot route operator has three or more locations, the 
operator needs both a slot route operators license and a 
restricted license. On the surface this criterion would not 
appear to be a large barrier to entry; however, the advantages 
that it gives to the incumbent firms may be a deterrent to 
potential entrants.
The slot route industry has all the major characteristics 
of oligopoly: highly concentrated market share, economies of 
scale, and a barrier to entry. Economic theory would lead one 
to believe that the market participants in a non-competitive 
and growing industry are likely to have above-normal rates of 
return. Economics literature also leads to the conclusion 
that the firms in the industry have an incentive to collude, 
and thus further lessen competition.7 The performance for the 
firms in the slot route industry is examined by calculating 
the Tobin's q for the relevant firms and their return on 
equity. In addition, the slot route firms' relative rates of 
return on their stock price over the past two years is 
examined and compared that to the return on the stock market 
as a whole. These measures offer some evidence on the 
presence of non-competitive business practices.
6Jackpot Enterprises, "Annual Report," 1991.
7C.E. Ferguson, and S. Charles Maurice. Economic Analysis 
(Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1970), p. 237.
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III. SLOT ROUTE MARKET STRUCTURE
This first section will discuss the derived demand for 
products and services of slot route firms. In addition, 
substitute products and the product differentiation between 
the firms will be discussed. Since these firms provide 
machines for players at non-casinos, our discussion focuses on 
the derived demand for gaming machines at restricted
locations. Only cursory attention will be given to the slot 
machine player.
A. Some Aspects of the Market for Slot Route 
Firms' Products and Services
Definition of Slot Route Operator 
According to Nevada Revised Statue 463.018 a slot route 
operator:
Means a person who, under any agreement whereby 
consideration is paid or payable for the right to 
place slot machines, engages in the business of 
placing and operating slot machines upon the
business premises of at least three or more
locations.
A slot machine is considered a gaming device that is coin 
operated. This definition includes the traditional reel- type 
slots as well as video poker, keno, blackjack, and other
similar games. The businesses that have a restricted license
1Nevada. Revised Statues. (1991).
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are mostly supermarkets, drug stores, merchandise stores, 
convenience stores, bars, and restaurants.
At the end of fiscal year 1990-91 there were 77 licensed 
slot route operators in the state of Nevada.2 The slot route 
operator usually places slot machines in businesses that have 
a restricted gaming license.3 Under Nevada Revised Statute 
463.161 this is a business that "has 15 or fewer slot machines 
and the operation of the slot machines is incidental to the 
primary business conducted [at the establishment]."4
Types of Slot Machine Licenses 
Gaming is legal in all parts of Nevada according to state 
law; however, some locations are precluded by local 
ordinance.5. Gaming licenses are of two types; restricted and 
non-restricted. The restricted licenses are for 15 or fewer 
slot machines and non-restricted licenses are for more than 15 
slot machines and table games such as craps, blackjack, and 
roulette.
Nevada gaming businesses with restricted licenses have 
fewer than one-sixth as many slot machines as those with non­
Nevada. "1991 Fiscal Year to Date Report," Nevada Gaming 
Commission and Gaming Control Board. (1991).
3Some slot route operators own or run casinos.
4Nevada. Revised Statues. (1991).
5The city of Boulder City, Nevada, has no legalized 
gambling.
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restricted as restricted licenses.6 The competition provided 
by casinos with non-restricted licenses is enormous. In the 
338 non-restricted locations there were over 135,000 slots in 
operation, compared to only 15,000 machines in restricted 
locations as of June 30, 1991.7 Along with
the slots, the non-restricted licenses holders (casinos) also 
offer tables games such as blackjack, roulette and craps to 
entertain their clientele. In addition to the greater 
diversity games, certain gambling halls are commonly thought 
to have a higher payout ratio on their slots than other 
casinos and restricted gaming operators. For example, the 
Boulder Highway and downtown Las Vegas casinos in Clark county 
are also believed to offer higher payout ratios. Casinos also 
offer a greater variety of entertainment such as shows, live 
bands, slot clubs, bowling, and bingo. Furthermore, casinos 
offer very competitively priced food and beverages, make 
extensive use of coupon discounting, and provide complimentary 
products and services to good customers. Consequently, 
players tend to spend more at the casinos than at the 
restricted locations. And it is generally held that a visit 
to a restricted license location is a casual affair for which 
consumers have a limited budget. Thus, slot route operators 
face a derived demand for their products and services for 
which there is intense competition.
6Nevada. "1991 Fiscal Year to Date Reports," p. 14.
7Ibid.
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Differentiations of Slot Route Operators 
Products and Services
To a casual observer, the slot route operator need only 
supply machines and coins for the establishments that carry 
their machines. But the slot route operator does much more to 
solicit and maintain its clientele. "Machines are routinely 
serviced, repaired, and maintained by mechanics."8 Indeed 
twenty-four hour servicing is an important way in which firms 
compete.9 The ability to ensure proper machine operations 
keeps customers happy and increases profitability for both 
parties.
Although slot route operators compete with an almost 
homogeneous product, there are different ways in which the 
competing firms try to differentiate their products. One of 
the ways that the slot route operators compete is by product 
differentiation through the use of progressive slot machines. 
These slot machines use a jackpot that increases incrementally 
with each bet. Slot route operators also may loan start-up 
capital to businesses to increase their client base. Price 
competition is also used. For example, slot route operators 
may aggressively pursue chain stores, where the amount of 
potential revenue is expected to be high.
8U.S., Securities and Exchange Commission, Jackpot
Enterprises. Inc.. Form-IOK. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1991), 
p. 2.
9Ibid., p. 2.
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Types and Numbers of Slot Operators Licenses 
As with all gaining in the state of Nevada, the slot route 
operators need to be licensed. They must possess a slot 
operators license. Additionally, each establishment that 
contains slot machines needs a restricted gaming license. As 
of June 30, 1991, there were 77 slot route operators licensed 
in the state of Nevada.10 This figure reflects a decrease 
from the 83 route operators in the state for the same time 
period in 1986. There were 1,849 restricted licenses in 
effect as of June 6, 1991.
Procedures for Obtaining a Slot Operators License 
A slot route license is issued to a route operator if the 
operator presently has 3 or more locations or a commitment to 
shortly have 3 or more locations.11 But this license will 
only be issued when a proprietor has already obtained a 
restricted license. To obtain a restricted license where 
there has not been one is usually costly and time consuming. 
Background checks on a prospective licensee include 
investigations of both business and personal associations, as 
well as financial transactions. Moreover, there is also no 
assurance that after thousands of dollars are spent that a
10Nevada. "Quarterly Gaming Report," p. 17
11Nevada. Revised Statues. (1991) .
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license will be issued12. The risk of not getting a license, 
the out-of-pocket costs, and the time necessary to complete 
the license procedure keeps many potential entrants out and 
functions as a significant barrier to entry.
Restricted licenses are also limited. "Many visitors to 
Nevada are surprised when they discover slot machines in 
airports, grocery stores and laundromats."13 Despite the 
seeming omnipresence of gaming in Nevada, the gaming 
authorities have the "responsibility to assure that the 
location of gaming devices is consistent with state policy to 
promote public welfare."14
Restrictions to Licensing
By regulation, the following locations are unsuitable for 
gaming:
1. Premises near churches, schools, hospitals,
and public playgrounds;
2. Premises in a location contrary to local
zoning ordinance unless the premises housed 
gaming before the effective date of current 
zoning;
3. Premises difficult to police;
4. Premises lacking adequate supervision or
surveillance;
12Currently the application fee for a restricted license 
is $500. The per hour charge for background checking is $150. 
These fees, along with attorney's fees for an applicant, can 
easily surpass several thousand dollars.
13Anthony N. Cabot, (ed.), Nevada Gaming Law. (Las Vegas,
Nevada: Lionel, Sawyer and Collins, 1991), p. 46.
14Ibid., p. 47.
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5. Premises having a substantial minor clientele 
unless the applicant can show sufficient 
precautions to separate the area used by 
minors from the gaming areas; and
6. Brothels.15
Even if the establishment's location is suitable, there 
are also other criteria. Among these are:
1. The amount of floor space used for gaming and
that used for the primary business.
2. The amount of investment in slots compared to
that of the investment in the business.
3. The amount of time used to manage the slots 
compared to the business.
4. The revenue generated from the slots compared 
the primary business.
5. The portion of financing from the slot route 
operator used for the creation of the 
business.
6. Other factors such as name, marketing practice
or public perception showing that the slot 
machines are or are not incidental to the 
primary business.16
In four circumstances there is a presumption that a slot 
machine operation is incidental to the primary business. 
These are:
1. Taverns;
2. Convenience stores with no more than seven 
slot machines;
3. Grocery stores; and
4. Drug stores.
,5Ibid.
16Ibid., p. 49.
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These four areas are where most slot route operators have 
their machines.17
Placement Arrangements
Slot route operators have two types of placement 
arrangements with their customers: subleasing or licensing 
space, and revenue sharing18. Each type of agreement is 
suited to particular locations.
Affiliated chain stores will generally sublease or 
license space in their stores to a slot route operator. The 
average rent charged for the space is approximately $125 per 
machine per month.19 The rent paid has recently increased 
because of the competition to place slot machines at chain 
stores.20 The advantage to the sublease or licensing is that 
the chain store does not need a license, thereby keeping the 
chain stores out of the management of gaming activity and 
avoiding the costly licensing process.
The other type of agreement is revenue sharing. This 
agreement is made with an establishment whereby slots are 
placed in the business and the revenue generated is split with
17Ibid., p. 50
18U.S., SEC, United Gaming. Form-IOK. p. 4.
19The $125 per month charge per machine was obtained from 
Jackpot Enterprises shareholder relations department.
Z0In order to keep a chain store as a long-term customer, 
slot route operators will renegotiate a lease before it 
expires by offering a higher rent. In the process the lease is 
extended but the costs of operating at those locations is 
increased.
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the business. This split is usually a 60-40 percent split, 
with 60 percent going to the establishment and the rest to the 
slot route operator.21 However, the percentage usually 
changes if a slot route operator has made a loan to the 
business. The more money the slot route operator loaned the 
business, the higher percentage of revenue the slot route 
operator will take from the establishment.
Most businesses use slot route operators because of the 
efficiencies they produce. Otherwise, compliance cost of a 
firm trying to enter this market would be high. Furthermore, 
a firm would lose revenue during the period it is securing a 
license. Also, the time and effort managing gaming operations 
would likely impose increased inefficiencies and deter 
specialization from the companies main business endeavors.
B. Firm Size and Structure of Nevada's 
Slot Route Industry
The slot route industry is structured as an oligopoly. 
The four biggest firms control over 70 percent of the market. 
United Gaming, Jackpot Enterprises, International Gaming 
Technology (IGT) and Electronic Data Technology (EDT) are the 
primary players in this market. The four firms are in control 
of 11,699 (75.8 percent) out of 15,434 slot machines operating
21The figures were obtained through the interviewing of 
several bar owners in the Las Vegas Valley.
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with a restricted license in operation as of June 30, 1991.22
The major player in the slot route industry is United 
Gaming. The company, through its subsidiary United Coin, 
holds a 35.12 percent [5,420 out of 15,434 total slots in the 
industry] of market share.23 United Gaming has been a major 
player in the market since the late 1960's. From 1986 to 
1991, United Gaming almost doubled the amount of outstanding 
slots from 2,840 to 5,454.24 This increase is compared to a 
total of 50 percent growth in the number of restricted slots 
statewide. Of these 5,454 slots, 3,990, (73.2 percent), were 
at revenue-sharing locations and the rest at space-lease 
locations.25
Another strong operator IGT, and its subsidiary EDT have 
the next largest share of the market, 22.61 percent.[3,490 of 
15,434 total slots in the industry).26,27 The breakdown of 
the machines into revenue sharing and leasing is not disclosed
22U.S., SEC, Jackpot Enterprises. Form-IOK. p. 5; U.S., 
SEC, International Gaming Technology. Form-IOK. p. 16; U.S., 
SEC, United Gaming. Form-IOK. p. 15; U.S., SEC, Electronic 
Data Technologies. Form-IOK. p. 10.
23U.S., Securities and Exchange Commission, United Gaming 
Form-IOK. (Washington D.C.; GPO, 1991), p. 16.
24Ibid., p. 9.
25 Ibid.
26IGT held close to 45 percent of EDT stock and paid some 
of EDT expenses. EDT was a subsidiary of IGT until 1987 when 
IGT sold over 50 percent of its stake in the company.
27U.S., Securities and Exchange Commission, International 
Gaming Technology. Form-IOK. (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1991), 
p. 7.
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by the company.
Jackpot Enterprises is another major player in the market 
with 18.07 percent [2,787 of 15,434 total slots in the 
industry].28 Jackpot obtained 78 percent, of its revenue from 
lease and sublease agreements according to its 1991 10K.
The following table summarizes the key market share 
information for the Nevada slot route industry.
TABLE 1
NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF SLOT MACHINES FOR 
NEVADA SLOT ROUTE FIRMS, 1991
Firm Number of 
Machines
Percentage
United Gaming 5,420 35.12%
IGT and EDT 3,490 22.61%
Jackpot Ent. 2,787 18.07%
Others 3,737 24.20%
Total 15,434 100.00%
Source: U.S., SEC, International Gaming Technol­
ogy Form-1OK. p. 16; U.S., SEC, Electronic Data 
Technology. Form-IOK. p. 10: U.S., SEC, United 
Gaming. Form-IOK. p. 15; U.S., SEC, Jackpot Ent­
erprises. Form-IOK. p. 5. Nevada, Gaming Commis­
sion, "Quarterly Report, June 30, 1991."
28U.S., SEC, Jackpot Enterprises. Form-IOK. p. 12.
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C. Estimation of the Herfindahl-Herschman 
Concentration Ratio
The Herfindahl-Herschman Index, referred to as HHI, is a
measure of industry concentration. It is calculated by
squaring the market shares of each firm in the industry and
adding the squared shares of the firms in the industry. The
computed HHI can then be compared to the number the United
States Department of Justice designates as to level of
concentration of the slot route market.
The Department of Justice publishes general 
guidelines as to what is considered a highly concentrated 
market.
The Department divides the spectrum of market 
concentration as measured by the HHI into three 
regions that can be broadly characterized as 
unconcentrated (HHI below 1000), moderately 
concentrated (HHI between 1000 and 1800), and 
highly concentrated (HHI above 1800). An empirical 
study by the Department of the size dispersion of 
firms within markets indicates that the critical 
HHI thresholds at 1000 and 1800 correspond roughly 
to four-firm concentration ratios of 50 percent and 
70 percent.29
Calculation of the HHI with IGT and EDT are taken as a 
single entity and is as follows:
(3.1) HHI = (35.12)A2+(22.61)A2+(18.07)A2= 1,869.
According to the Department of Justice, this industry would be 
considered highly concentrated because the HHI exceeds
29U.S., Department of Justice, Antitrust Division Manual 
(Washington D.C.: GPO, 1987) sec. II, p. 133.
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1,800.30 A major factor which would influence the ratio is 
the definition of the market. If all gaming firms were to be 
considered, this ratio would be smaller because the largest 
firms hold only a small market share.
Other firms in the slot route market include Anchor Coin 
and Bally Manufacturing. Including these firms in the 
analysis would reduce the HHI coefficient. However Anchor 
Coin is a privately held company, its financial statements are 
not publicly available. Also, Bally Manufacturing did not 
disclose any of their slot route operations statistics in 
their financial reports to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission.31 But in talks with Jackpot and IGT shareholder 
relations departments, they conservatively estimated that the 
two firms have at least 1,200 slot machines between them.32 
At these numbers the HHI coefficient would be less than 1,800; 
nevertheless, the available information is sufficient to reach 
the conclusion that economic concentration is present.
The geographic dispersion of the firms is limited. The 
firms are located in the two areas where the bulk of the 
population of the state live, Las Vegas and Reno. Jackpot, 
United Gaming, and Electronic Data Technology are 
headquartered in Las Vegas, and IGT is in Reno. Nevertheless,
30Ibid.
31U.S., SEC, Bally Manufacturing. Form-IOK.
32Lauren Watson, interview by author, Las Vegas, Nevada, 
October 1991.
all have offices in other cities where they do business, that 
is, United Gaming and Jackpot have offices in Reno, and IGT 
has an office in Las Vegas.
Most of the revenue for the industry is generated in the 
urban areas of the state. But the slot route operators do 
serve small towns. The rural sites are usually serviced from 
Reno and Las Vegas. For example, Laughlin and Mesquite are 
serviced from the Las Vegas and similar range hold for Reno.
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IV. SLOT ROUTE FIRM CONDUCT AND STRATEGIES
Since all the slot route operators have leases on which 
their revenue are based, they capture market share by being 
aggressive in acquiring leases. This is done by offering a 
more generous revenue split or by increasing the amount of 
rent paid to the lease locations. The firms may also seek new 
locations to place their machines. This includes newly opened 
establishments or other businesses that previously did not 
have slots.
IGT and its subsidiary, EDT use technology that was 
developed for IGT's casino customers to differentiate their 
products. EDT developed what is called Megabucks for casinos 
throughout Nevada. Megabucks is a multilocation progressive 
slot machine system. This system links slot machines in 
different locations into a progressive system in which a 
jackpot increases incrementally with each bet. Although other 
slot route operators have progressive machines, they are 
limited to one particular location. The IGT Megapoker, like 
the Megabucks, links all locations that desire the service. 
This multilocational linking allows jackpots to begin at high 
levels ($20,000) and to progress at a more rapid rate. The 
jackpot is won by getting a royal flush in sequence: an ace to 
a ten. Since jackpots are higher, customers will prefer to
2 1
play these machines more frequently, other things being equal, 
than machines which are not linked. Locations that have 
Megapoker generally have a banner outside the location 
announcing the presence of the system.
IGT is also the largest manufacturer of slots in Nevada. 
The company estimates that their market share for new slots in 
Nevada is over 70 percent. IGT asserts that their machines are 
among the most attractive and popular.1 Since many of the 
machines are also located in casinos, familiarity with the 
product is also important.
United Gaming, through its subsidiary United Coin, also 
tries to differentiate its product. United Gaming, like IGT, 
also manufactures its own slot machines. But United Gaming 
has not been as successful as IGT in selling slots to third 
parties.2 Among the reasons for this lack of success is the 
competition United Gaming has faced from IGT and its lack of 
commitment to the market. United Gaming is the largest slot 
route operator in Nevada with a long history in the business.3 
Most of United Gaming's slots, 3,990 out of 5,454, are in 
revenue-sharing locations/ United Gaming was successful in 
obtaining a large part of this market by being very aggressive
international Gaming Technology, "Annual Report," 1991.
2United Gaming now only manufactures slot machines for 
its own use. U.S., SEC, United Gaming Form-IOK. p. 17.
3Ibid.
ibid. , p. 6.
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in getting individual locations. One of the ways they
developed this market was by to lending money to 
establishments to assist in their opening, thereby giving 
United Gaming a new client. This type of lending has enabled 
United Gaming to attract clients that might have gone 
elsewhere. As of June 6, 1991, the amount outstanding of 
these loans was close to $9 million.5
The last large market player is Jackpot Enterprises. 
"Generally Jackpot subleases or leases space in stores which 
are part of a chain of stores."6 Jackpot believes that the 
chain stores are greater volume locations. As a consequence of 
the greater foot traffic there is a higher likelihood the 
machines will be played. But there is an inherent risk in 
concentrating on leasing space from a chain store. When one 
acquires the right to place machines at a chain store 
locations in Nevada, the slot route operator must purchase 
enough machines to place in all the stores if enough machines 
are not in inventory. If a chain store has 15 locations, the 
need is for 225 machines. The risk comes into play when the 
lease nears its expiration. If Jackpot is not able to renew 
the lease, a large number of machines come off line causing 
revenue to drop considerably. The company then has a large 
inventory of unused slots. However, Jackpot has been
5U.S., SEC, United Gaming. Form-IOK. p. 17.
6U.S., SEC, Jackpot Enterprises. Form-IOK. p. 4.
23
successful in not allowing this adverse impact to occur. 
Jackpot has been successful in renegotiating leases before 
contract expiration. The credit worthiness of the firm is 
also pivotal in the lease process. Most chain stores want to 
be reasonably assured that the rental agreement will be 
honored. Since Jackpot has an excellent history in its lease 
arrangements, chain stores have tended to favor this 
operator.
Many of the slot route operators have also tried to 
increase revenues by purchasing or building casinos. IGT owns 
and operates hotel casinos in Sparks and Hawthorne, as well as 
riverboat gaming on the Mississippi in Iowa.7 Jackpot 
Enterprises also owns and operates casinos in Battle Mountain, 
Nevada, and Deadwood, South Dakota. The company's Deadwood 
properties are not profitable though Jackpot will soon expand 
into riverboat gaming in the vicinity of Memphis, Tennessee.8 
United Gaming also owns a casino in the Reno/Sparks area 
according to its 1991 Form-IOK. All the companies' expansions 
into the traditional casino business face stiff competition. 
They will only be marginal players in this market. 
Furthermore, expansion in current slot markets faces growth 
opportunities limited by population growth and new business 
development. Not surprisingly, these firms have chosen to
7U.S., SEC, International Gaming Technology. Form-IOK. p.
3.
^.S. SEC, Jackpot Enterprises. Form 10K. p. 8.
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enter the casino business in other states in order to grow.
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V. FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF 
SLOT ROUTE FIRMS
Less competitive industries generally tend to have more 
profitable companies. However, some economic profits can be 
spent by managers for other "objectives, including growth, 
grandeur, an easier life (and) avoidance of risk."1 Of 
course, these non-profit maximizing activities tend to be 
corrected in the long-run. Yet, firms in an non-competitive 
industry may not be earning monopoly profits in the short-run 
given the above conditions. These issue aside, financial 
measures offer useful evidence for evaluating an industry's 
performance.
A. Estimates of Return on Equity
One way to judge the performance of a company is by its 
return on equity. The discussion of return on equity will be 
restricted to United Gaming and Jackpot Enterprises because 
most of IGT's sales were slot machines themselves, and not 
slot route operations, and IGT also paid some of EDT's 
expenses.2 Therefore EDT's data is not a fair representation
1William G. Shepherd, The Economics of Industrial 
Organization (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 
(1979), p. 378.
2U.S. SEC, International Gaming Technology. Form-IOK.
p. 5.
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of profitability.
The profit rates for the Jackpot and United Gaming 
decreased markedly since 1989 as shown on Table 2. Around the 
same time, a large expansion occurred in the number of slot 
machines in the industry. This was at a time when the slot 
route operators expanded into casinos, which adversely 
affected profits. One problem with return on equity measure is 
that they fail to account for debt/equity ratios. That is, 
the return on debt and the firm's risk are not addressed. 
Therefore, Tobin's q and Jensen's coefficient are introduced 
in the following sections of this study.
TABLE 2
ESTIMATED RETURN ON EQUITY FOR 
TWO NEVADA SLOT ROUTE FIRMS 
IN PERCENT, 1990-1991
Firm 1991 1990
Jackpot Ent. 7.8% 13.3%
United Gaming (-49.6%) 9.1%
Source: U.S., SEC, Jackpot Enterprises. Form-IOK. 
p. 20; U.S., SEC, United Gaming. Form-IOK. p. 22.
B. Estimates of the Return on Assets's 
Using Tobin's q
The following is the formula for the calculation of Tobin's q:
(5.1) Tobin's q = market value of assets
estimated replacement costs
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"The numerator of the q includes all the firm's debt and 
equity securities, and not just its common stock. The 
denominator includes all assets, not just the firm's net 
worth."3 This ratio generally means that the ratio would be 
near 1 for competitive firms and higher than 1 for the less 
competitive markets. As markets become less competitive, 
assets earn a higher return and this pushes the q ratio above 
one. "A ratio above unity in the absence of barriers to entry 
would attract new entrants, driving q down in the direction of 
unity as the excess returns were driven to zero. On the other 
hand, a monopolist protected by barriers to entry would 
experience market capitalization of any monopoly rents. The 
market value of the firm would exceed its replacement cost and 
q would persist above unity. "A As a result, the q then can be 
used as a proxy for monopoly power.
In using this ratio several problems exist. The first 
problem is determining the replacement costs of the assets. 
Since the majority of the slot companies' assets are gaming 
equipment, the assets will be valued at cost. This is done 
because, as gaming has proliferated throughout the country and 
new gaming manufacturers have entered the market, prices for 
gaming equipment have softened. A second problem is the
3R.A. Brealy, and S. Meyers, Principles of Corporate 
Finance (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1988), p. 60.
4Chen, K.C., G.L. Hite, D.C. Cheng, "Barriers to Entry, 
Concentration and Tobins q Ratio," Quarterly Journal of 
Business and Economics 28, (Spring 1989), p. 34.
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fluctuating value of the price of the common stock of the 
companies.
The q ratios for the two companies were computed for 1991 
highs and lows of the common stock, and an average q will be 
calculated. The q for IGT and EDT will not be calculated 
because the data is not in usable form. IGT's q will be high 
due to large growth in sales and profits in its gaming 
equipment sales division and not from its slot route. EDT had 
some assets paid for by IGT making the data unusable.
TABLE 3
ESTIMATED TOBIN'S Q FOR TWO NEVADA 
SLOT ROUTE FIRMS AT HIGH AND LOW 
STOCK PRICES, 1991
Firm High Low Average1
Jackpot Ent. 1.90 1.43 1.66
United Gaming 1.82 0.96 1.39
Note: 1The average is computed as the mean of the 
high and low q values.
Source: U.S., SEC, Jackpot Enterprises. Form-IOK. 
p. 20; U.S., SEC, United Gaming. Form-IOK. p. 22.
The q ratio for Jackpot is above one for both high and 
low stock prices. This suggests there are some monopoly 
profits that the firm is capitalizing into its stock price. 
United Gaming's q has one observation approximately equal to 
one. This value suggests that it might be operating around the 
replacement costs of its assets and not enjoying monopoly
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profits. Nevertheless, the average values for both firms are 
greater than one. Q ratios in the study by Chen, Hite and 
Cheng in show that industries with very high barriers to entry 
had an average q of 2.467.5 And that all other group q's were 
not significantly different from one. Taking the two q's 
together, the data suggest that there is not that high a 
barrier to entry into the industry. The q ratios for the slot 
route industry do not fall into the high barrier group. But 
since the q's are on average above one, there is evidence 
that some monopoly profits are being capitalized. Yet, a study 
done by Smirlock in 1984 found a median q ratio of 1.69.6 
Thus, the slot route industry's competitiveness appears to be 
about average and economic profits do not seem significant.
C. Nevada Slot Route Operators Common Stock Return 
Adjusted for Risk Using Jensen's 
Performance Index
Jensen's performance index measures asset performance 
adjusted for risk. Based on the capital asset model, this 
index is identified as follows:7
5Ibid., p. 47.
6Smirlock, M., T. Gilligan, and W. Marshall, "Tobin's q 
and Structure-Performance Relation," American Economic Review 
(December 1984), p. 1057.
7For a discussion of the measurement of stock and 
portfolio performance, including the Jensen performance index, 
see Robert C. Radcliffe, 2nd ed., Investments: Concepts
Analysis, and Strategy (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman 
and Company, 1987), pp. 813-842.
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(5.2) R(i,t)-RF(t)= A(i)+ B(i)[ RM(t)- RF(t)] , where
R(i,t)= holding period rate of return on the ith 
asset at time t;
RF(t)= holding period rate of return on the risk 
free asset at time t;
RM(t)= holding period rate of return on the market 
portfolio at time t;
B(i)= the estimated beta for the ith asset; and 
A(i)= Jensens performance index.
If the values for the calculated A(i) are positive, the ith 
asset, in our case the slot industries firm's common stock 
outperformed the market adjusted for risk. If the A(i) is 
negative, the common stock under performed the market adjusted 
for risk. The B(i) coefficients, referred to as betas, were 
from Standard and Poors.8 The betas were calculated by 
Standard and Poors using the five year stock price information 
and the Standard and Poors 500 hundred index. The market 
premium, [(RM(t)-RF(t)], is the difference between the return 
on the market and the risk free rate of return. The holding 
period rates of return for common stocks is dividends for the 
period plus capital gains as a percent of the beginning stock 
price.9
8Standard and Poors Stock Reports Index. March 1992.
9See J.C. Francis and S.H. Archer, 2nd ed., Portfolio 
Analysis. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 
1979), pp. 8-11 for formulas used here.
Negative Jensen coefficients were computed for 1990 for two 
slot industry firms, see table 4. This indicates that returns
TABLE 4
Jensen Coefficients for Nevada 
Slot Route Firms Measured in 
Percent, 1990-1991
Firm 1990 1991
Jackpot Ent. 0.016 (-0.014)
IGT 0.255 0.567
EDT (-3.262) 0.290
United Gaming (-4.241) (-0.480)
Source: Computed form Quotron, Citibank Data 
Services, New York.
adjusted for risk were below that of the market. For one firm, 
Jackpot Enterprises, the Jensen coefficient is near zero, 
indicating that the firm earned only a market rate of return. 
Only IGT outperformed the market when adjusted for risk. But 
as suggested previously, this performance largely reflects its 
slot machine manufacturing business. In 1991, the A(i) for 
Jackpot Enterprises was negative, indicating that the company 
under performed the market. Also the Jensen coefficient for 
United Gaming remained negative. On the other hand, the 
Jensen coefficients for Electronic Data Technology and 
International Gaming Technology were both positive. The reason 
behind Electronic Data's positive Jensen coefficient was that
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International Gaining offered to purchase all of the remaining 
shares of EDT that it did not own. And International Gaming's 
Jensen coefficient again was positive because of the large 
growth in its gaming machine manufacturing business, and not 
its slot route division. These Jensen performance estimates 
indicate that the slot route industry has not outperformed the 
market adjusted for risk. Thus, the risk adjusted evidence 
points to a conclusion that monopoly profits have not been 
capitalized into the common stock prices of these companies.
t
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VI. DISCUSSION OF NON-COMPETITIVE ASPECTS 
OF THE SLOT ROUTE INDUSTRY
Unlike perfect competition and monopoly, oligopoly has no 
prevailing single theory to explain why some markets are 
structured with few firms. Yet, two dominant reason offered 
for oligopoly are barriers to entry and economies of scale. 
These reasons and how they relate to the slot route industry 
are now discussed in greater detail.
A. Barriers to Entry
"A barrier to entry may be defined as a cost of producing 
(at some or every rate of output) which must be borne by a 
firm which seeks to enter an industry but is not borne by 
firms already in the industry."1 An especially sizable 
barrier to entry in the slot route industry is the gaming 
license. Prior to entry into the gaming industry, individuals 
or firms must pass a strict gaming licensing process. As 
previously mentioned, this process costs a minimum of several 
thousand dollars to upwards of hundreds of thousands of 
dollars. This investigation involves the background checks of 
all applicants, including the applicants' personal and 
financial history. Many potential applicants do not wish to
1George Stigler, Organization of Industry (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 67.
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subject themselves to this process, limiting the potential 
entrants. The outcome of the process is never certain, so the 
risk of spending large amounts of money and being deemed 
unsuitable for the license is another factor limiting the 
potential entrants. The application process for the gaming 
license also takes an extended period of time during which the 
applicant can not solicit potential clients.
B. Economies of Scale
"The economies of scale constitute the relationship 
between the size of a firm (or plant) and its costs of
production in the broadest sense."2 Generally firms tend to 
get more efficient as they grow because specialization of the 
work force, as well as other efficiencies, can develop. But 
there is a point at which the firm no longer gains in
efficiency as it grows and may actually have a decline in 
efficiency. This is the point of diseconomies of scale. This 
point leads to the theory that there exists an optimal firm 
size in each industry.
In the slot route industry, the company with only a 
few locations might have the nightshift employees who have 
very little to do. But they must be there because of the 
twenty-four hour nature of the business and because of
competitive pressure to do so. But as the firm's routes
grows, specialization of the work force can occur. The
2Ibid.
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distribution of coins and the maintenance of the machines can 
become separate increasingly efficient tasks. The firms that 
control most of the market share in the slot route industry 
achieve these efficiencies. The firms also can have a 
specialized administration which can deal in the payment of 
gaming taxes, (most counties differ in gaming tax structures), 
or the counting of coins taken from the establishments.
Integration of a slot route operator and the supplier 
of slots has shown to be of no competitive advantage. 
International Gaming Technology produces its own slots for 
both itself and the rest of the gaming industry. IGT has been 
extremely successful in the manufacturing of slots, and that 
has been an asset to its slot route division. On the other 
hand, United Gaming also manufactures its own slots and has 
not had much success. Jackpot Enterprises purchases its slots 
from the producer that it thinks makes the best and most 
popular games. The effects of integration vary by firm, and 
any conclusions reached must be extensively qualified. Thus, 
conclusions would be of limited use.
C. Valuation of a Restricted Gaming License
One way to determine whether or not monopoly profits 
are being made is to compare how much the slot route locations 
sell for, and their actual asset value. At the end of January 
1991, Jackpot Enterprises purchased the assets of Corral 
Country Coin, Inc. The total purchase price for the company
was $1,656 million. Of that amount, only approximately 
$321,000 was allocated for the purchase of tangible assets. 
The bulk of the purchase price, $1,372 million, was for 
goodwill and intangibles. The goodwill and intangibles 
amounted to $4,733 per machine or about $71,000 per location 
assuming 15 machines per location. The substantial amount 
that was paid over what the assets were worth shows either 
that holding the gaming license produces some economics 
profits or that a bad decision was made. Nevertheless, the 
available evidence suggests that the incumbent firms hold a 
favorable market position.
37
VII. CONCLUSIONS
One might expect the slot route industry to earn economic 
profits, but the firms do not. To be sure, the structure of 
the slot route industry as measured by the HHI is highly 
concentrated. Furthermore, the four major firms conduct 
themselves so as to differentiate their products. However, 
slot route firms' Tobin's q and Jensen coefficient indicate 
they do not outperform other markets. That is, there was no 
significant evidence of economic profits found.
Some accounting for the lack of economic profits is 
through industry consolidation. As firms in the slot route 
industry are purchased, any monopoly profits that are present 
are capitalized into the purchase price. This helps explain 
why Jackpot Enterprises would pay close to $5,000 per slot 
machine above the asset value of a purchased slot route 
operator.
High concentration and the lack of evidence of economic 
profits may be expected in the face of competition from 
casinos. Casinos are much larger than the slot route 
operators and, they offer a more diversified gaming product. 
Moreover, casinos generate much more revenue than slot route 
operators. The slot route operators have approximately one- 
ninth the number of slots as the casinos. The slot route 
industry is a secondary market in the Nevada gaming industry
operating where the large casinos choose not to. Thus, the 
reason that the slot route industry did not create the amount 
of economic profits one might expect is largely inherent in 
the definition of the slot route industry.
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